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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
By full and judicious use of the procedure available to them, the
courts of Montana can realize in the case of a Rule 23(a)(3) action the
goal of the adoption of the new Rules in Montana-"the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.'
CONRAD B. FREDRICKS
COMPENSATION FOR TAKING OF FLOWAGE EASEMENTS
BY CONDEMNATION
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of whether or not
flowage easements are "private property" requiring just compensation for
a taking by condemnation under the fifth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. A flowage easement, as the term is used in this dis-
cussion, refers to the right of one owner to flow water upon the land of
another by maintenance of a dam.
Reduced to its elements, eminent domain is nothing more than the power
of the sovereign to take property for public use without the consent of the
owner.' Anything else found in the numerous definitions which have re-
ceived judicial recognition merely states a limitation or qualification of the
power.' Eminent domain as a separate identifiable concept can be traced
to the natural law movement of the seventeenth century,8 although the power
to take private property for public use has doubtless been exercised since
the days of the Romans.' Hugo Grotius apparently originated the phrase
"'eminent domain" in 1625.' He used the term to designate the power of the
state over private property within its bounds, and although his theory of
eminent domain was not adopted in the United States, it provided a basis
for the solution of the problems which have arisen in the integration of the
doctrine into our modern law. One writer has said: "Briefly stated, the
concept of eminent domain created by the natural law movement rested, no
matter whether the superior right of the state over private property or the
idea of sovereignty was the basis, upon concepts of the power of govern-
ment." The Supreme Court of the United States early recognized that in
a civil society, the property of a citizen or subject is subject to the lawful
demands of the sovereign.' Thus the court has said: "The right of eminent
domain is the offspring of political necessity and is inseparable from soV-
'MONTANA RuLE 1, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2701-1.
'Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, 394 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888).21 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (Sackman and Van Brunt, 3d ed. 1950). (Here-
inafter, NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (Sackman and Van Brunt, 3d ed. 1950) will be
cited NICHOLS.)81 THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 945 (1895).
'1 NICHOLS § 1.12.
'5 DE JuRE BELLI Er PACIS, Lib. III, C. 20.8Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596(1942).
"Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870).
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eregnty unless denied to it by its fundamental law."' The power of eminent
domain does not require recognition by constitutional provision, but exists
in absolute form.' And, since the power of eminent domain is considered an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, positive assertion of limitations upon the
power is required.'
While payment of compensation is not an essential element in the mean-
ing of eminent domain, it is an essential element in the valid exercise of such
power.' The principle of necessity of compensation to an individual whose
property is taken for public use has been one of the most universally recog-
nized principles of justice.' It was found in the Roman law, the Code
Napoleon, and in the legal systems of the American colonies.' The fifth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in part:
"... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." The guarantee of this amendment was designed to bar the
United States from forcing some persons to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Clearly,
the power of the state to take private property, and the right of the property
owner to compensation, spring from different sources-the right of the state
springs from necessity of government and the right of the individual from
natural rights.' This difference in origin is important to any consideration
and construction of the constitutional command.
The language of the constitutional provision, although apparently clear
and without ambiguity, has presented countless questions for judicial deter-
mination. Numerous problems have been encountered in defining a "tak-
ing'" and in defining "just compensation."" The problems involved in
defining "private property" in an age of ever-increasing complexity in all
traditional social institutions present even more perplexing and difficult
questions.
Probably nowhere is the problem of defining private property more
dramatically presented that in the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Company." In that
case, the power company had acquired through mesne conveyances a perpe-
tual and exclusive flowage easement over certain acreage. This acreage
adjoined a navigable stream which was contained within an area subsequent-
ly acquired by the United States for the site of a dam and reservoir. The
'Searl v. School District No. 2 in Lake County, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890).
'Mississippi, etc., Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878) ; Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367 (1875) ; New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836).
'01 NicHoLs § 1.3.
hi. § 1.11.
"Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L.
REv. 67 (1931).
"Cormack, Legal Concepts in, Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221 (1931).
"Armstrong v. United -States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
151 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 593.
"See, e.g. United States v. Dickinson, 331, U.S. 745 (1947) ; Sanguinetti v. United
States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924) ; United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1916) ; Bedford
v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904) ; Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
"See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp. 323 U.S. 373 (1945) ; United States
v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) ; United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304
U.S. 119 (1938) ; West v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U.S. 662
(1935) ; Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341 (1927) ; Archer v. United States,
53 Ct. Cl. 405, aff'd, 251 U.S. 548 (1920).
"365 U.S. 624 (1961).
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fee owner of the acreage agreed to convey to the Government a flowage ease-
ment in return for the payment of one dollar. This agreement was made
subjejet to the flowage rights of the respondent power company. The agree-
ment also provided that the Government could elect to acquire its easement
by a condemnation proceeding, in which event the agreed consideration of
one dollar would be the full amount of the award of just compensation. Ex-
ercising this election, the Government instituted condemnation proceedings
in the federal district court to acquire a flowage easement over the acreage,
and deposited one dollar as the estimated just compensation for the proper-
ty to be taken. The fee owner acknowledged the settlement contract and
agreed to the one dollar compensation. The respondent power company,
whose easement was to be destroyed, intervened in the proceedings to contest
the issue of just compensation. The district court made a substantial award
to the respondent as compensation for the taking of its flowage easement.
The judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals for the fourth circuit,
on authority of that court's prior decision in United States v. Twin City
Power Co." Thereafter, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in the
Twin City case' and vacated the judgment in the Virginia Electric litiga-
tion, remanding the case to the court of appeals for further consideration
in the light of that court's decision in the Twin City case." The court of ap-
peals, in turn, remanded the case to the district court with instructions that
the district court exclude from the computation of compensation any ele-
ment of value arising from the availability of the land for water power
purposes because it was situated on a navigable stream.' On remand, the
district court proceeded in accordance with these directions and awarded
respondent $65,520. On appeal to the circuit court the judgment was af-
firmed.'
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider the govern-
ment's claim that the respondent's easement had no compensable value
when appropriated by the United States.' The Court rejected the argu-
ment of the Government in the extreme form presented, but concluded
that the judgment should be set aside for a redetermination of the com-
pensation award. The Court declared that ". . . the maximum compensa-
tion payable for the flowage easement under any conceivable circumstances
is so much of the value of the lands for agricultural and forestry purposes
and for any other uses, not including hydroelectric power value, as the
casement owner has a right to destroy or depreciate. . . . Subject to that
maximum, the actual measure of compensation payable for the flowage
easement is the value of the easement to its owner .... ' The Court also
said that the lower court ". . . must exclude any depreciation in value
caused by the prospective taking once the Government 'was committed' to
the project. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly the impact of that event
upon the likelihood of actual exercise of the easement cannot be considered."
The Court noted that the Government had acknowledged that a flowage
"215 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1954).
"350 U.S. 222 (1956).
"350 U.S. 956 (1956).
"United States v. 2979.72 Acres of Land, 235 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1956).
"United States v. 2979.72 Acres of Land, 270 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1959).
"United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 362 U.S. 947 (1960).
"United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 635 (1961).
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easement is "property" within the meaning of the fifth amendment and
that there could be no question that the Government's destruction of that
easement would ordinarily constitute a taking of property within the mean-
ing of the amendment.' The Government argued, however, that it could
not be required to pay compensation for the destruction of the easement
in the present case because the easement was subject to the overriding navi-
gational servitude of the United States.' The dissenting opinion accepted
this argument and concluded that the easement had no value to the power
company at the time the Government took it.' The language of the dissent
cannot be ignored :'
* . . At all events, the clincher is that any right of the power com-
pany to "destroy" agricultural uses of these lands consisted solely
of its right to dam and back the river's waters upon them, and
when the Government determined to construct the dam for its own
benefit even that nebulous "right" was gone. Hence, the easement
had no possible value-not even a nuisance value-to the power
company at the time the Government took it.
The difficult questions presented by this decision and the varying
conclusions arrived at by the members of the Court demonstrate the care-
ful consideration which must be given to the interpretation of the language
of the fifth amendment. The majority opinion does not discuss the prob-
lem as involving any question of whether or not "property" as such is
present, but rather bases its discussion solely on considerations of "valua-
tion." The constitutional guaranty deals with the taking of "private
property," and, before considering any questions of proper valuation,
the Court should first consider the basic issue of whether any property
interest which must be recognized as compensable is present in a given
case.' The real issue in the Virginia Electric case was whether or not the
power company, under the circumstances, had a "property" interest the
taking of which required just compensation by the Government.
It is the object of this paper to discuss some of the definitions which
have been given to the term "property" by legal writers and by the federal
courts and then to consider the holding of the Virginia Electric case in
light of these definitions. It is not contended that the decision of the Court
in the Virginia Electric case was not correct, inasmuch as the Government
apparently conceded that a flowage easement constituted "private prop-
erty" in that case. It is submitted, however, that such concession by the
Government was neither a necessary nor a correct view of the serious ques-
tions which shall be considered.
SOME SOCIO-LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF "PROPERTY"
It should be noted that in the discussion to follow, "property" will
be used to refer only to interests in things rather than the things them-
selves. Any attempt to define the concept of property in fixed and rigid





1 LEWIs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 63 (3d ed. 1909).
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definite content fixed for all time."' Property law and social life are so
intimately interrelated that the institution of property is bound to change
in response to changes in the society where it exists." Human beings,
whether living in a condition where there is no readily cognizable social or-
ganization or in an extremely complicated social structure such as our
own, have various needs and desires. Many of these relate to external ob-
jects with which the-persons are in some way associated. The law of proper-
ty may be looked upon as an attempt on the part of the state to give a
systematized recognition of and protection to these attitudes and desires
on the part of individuals toward things. The nature and types of proper-
ty interests vary according to the subjectmatter of the property.' These
attitudes and desires are constantly changing. Thus, the concept of prop-
erty will vary from place to place and from century to century. Any
modern institution is a product of accumulated social development and
bears the traces and effects of the successive eras of preceding centuries."
Socio-legal thinkers have given much consideration to the formulation
of a workable definition and explanation of the concept. The problem is
extremely complex. One writer has said that property is "an abstract
term, indigenous to a way of thought, has meanings and compulsions of
its own; the institution of property is inseparable from the verbal symbol
through which the mind attempts to capture its actuality.'
Powell, in his work on real property, concludes that the sociologically
minded lawyer thinks of property as the cluster of social usages which regu-
lates the distribution of scarcities.' It is his contention that we should
believe (and act as if we believed) that private property must find its
justification solely in its social contribution.'
Halowell has described property as a ". . . complex system of recog-
nized rights and duties with reference to the control of valuable objects...
linked with basic economic processes . ..validated by traditional beliefs,
attitudes and values and sanctioned in custom and law.' This definition
involves four basic variable factors: the persons, the relationships, the ob-
jects, and the sanctions.
Hoebel has also considered the matter of the definition of property.""
Ie concludes that "property in its full sense is a web of social relations
with respect to the utilization of some object (material or non-material)
in which a person or group is tacitly or explicitly recognized to hold quasi-
exclusive and limiting connections to that object." In this view, the two
essential aspects of property are the object and the web of social relations
which establish a limiting and defined relationship between persons and
objects. Orthodox lawyers and economists have referred to this limiting
relationship as an exclusive right of use, but modern economists and most
'Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 696
(1938).
121 PowELL, REAL PIOPEaTY 6 (1949).
"l AIGLER, SMITH, AND TEFFr, CASES ON PROPERTY 1 (2d ed. 1942).
8'1 PowEL, op. cit. supra note 32, 6.
'Hamilton, Property, in 12 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 528 (1934).
'11 POwELL, op. cit. sup)a note 32, 7.
'Id. 10.
UThe Nature and Function of Property as a S'ocial Institution, 1 JOUNAL oF LEG.
AND POLT. SOC. 115 (1943).UThe Anthropology of Inheritance, SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 5 (1952).
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legal thinkers today recognize that "absolute" control over any object
is relative. The "exclusive right of control" is, at best, a quasi-exclusive
right, always limited by implicit claims and restraints imposed upon the
property owner by others.'
These definitions, while they do not entirely conform with each other,
contain no divergencies which are so pronounced as to make them irrecon-
cilable. They give some insight into the bases for the concept of property,
but they are of little more assistance in understanding the concept as it
is embodied in the fifth amendment than one other interesting definition:
"Property is a euphonius collocation of letters which serves as a general
term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the common-
wealth."" More substance is given to the problem by a consideration of the
definitions advance by leading writers in the field of eminent domain and
by determining the differences among those definitions.
Nichols" refers to the definition of Bentham, who wrote that "The
integral or entire right of property includes four particulars: (1) Right
of occupation; (2) Right of exluding others; (3) Right of disposition, or
the right of transferring the integral right to other persons; (4) Right of
transmission, in virtue of which the integral right is often transmitted
after the death of the proprietor, without any disposition on his part, to
those in whose possession he would have wished to place it.' Nichols
states that to those who follow such a concept of property, the corporeal
object, although the subject of property, is, when coupled with possession,
merely the indicia of invisible rights. Property in a specific object, accord-
ing to such a view, is composed of the rights of use, enjoyment, and disposi-
tion of such object to the exclusion of all others." Property has thus been
used with reference to the corporeal object which is the subject of owner-
ship and it has been used to indicate the aggregate of rights which an
owner possesses in or with respect to such corporeal object. Nichols makes
careful note of this distinction.'
Lewis defines property as "certain rights in things which pertain to
persons and which are created and sanctioned by law.'"' He indicates that
he means to assert that property is exactly what the law makes it." The
rights included are the rights of user, the rights of exclusion, and the right
of disposition." These rights are not possessed in absolute degree, but are
limited." Lewis contends that the word "property" in the constitution
should be given a meaning that accords with the ordinary usage and under-
standing of the large body of citizens who gave the instrument vitality by
their votesw and which will also secure to the individual the largest degree
'0M. at 9.
'
1Hamilton, op. cit. supra note 35, at 528.
a2 NICHOLS, § 5.1[1].
"BENTHAM'S WORKS 182 (1943 ed.)
"1 NICHOLS, § 5.1[2].
" Id. § 5.1[11].
"1 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 30, § 63.
"Id. § 63 n.5.
"Cf., note 44 supra.
"I1 Lswis, op. cit. supra note 30, § 63.
'wLewis indicates that the "understanding of the dullest individual among the peo-
ple" is that his property in anything is a bundle of rights. People act in reliance
of this idea all the time. Cf. note 31 supra.
NOTES19621
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of protection against the exercise of the power intended to be restricted.
Lewis asserts that his definition is best suited to meet both these require-
ments.5'
The difference in the approaches of Nichols and Lewis is evident.
Nichols approves a "physical" concept, wherein attention is directed
primarily toward things; Lewis adopts a "mental" concept wherein atten-
tion is directed to human beings. It will be seen that the courts have tended
toward the physical concept. Under the physical concept, in order for com-
pensation to be required, the condemnee must be deprived of the possession
of land or some other tangible, physical object. I Under the mental concept,
it is necessary, in order to require compensation, only that there be inter-
ference with some of the legal relations that, under this concept, constitute
his property.'
FEDERAL COURT DEFINITIONS
The courts of this nation have been called upon many times to define
''property" in order to resolve issues raised under particular fact situa-
tions. One writer has stated that "it is incorrect to say that the judiciary
protected property; rather they called that property to which they accord-
ed protection."' This statement may give great insight into the rationale
used by the courts in making specific decisions.
The Supreme Court has said that "property" is either the physical
thing which is the subject of ownership or is the aggregate of the owner's
right to control and dispose of that thing.'A Under the fifth amendment,
the word "property" has been held to denote the group of rights inhering
in a citizen's relations with others which result in certain powers over a
physical thing, such as the right to possess, use, and dispose of it. The
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest that the citizen
possesses.'
Property has been held to include every kind of right or interest,
capable of being enjoyed and recognized as such, upon which it is prac-
ticable to place a money value.' The mere fact, however, that a specific
right or interest has value does not, in and of itself, give it the status of
"property" within the constitutional limitation on taking." Ordinarily,
a person has "propery" in a thing if he has untrammeled freedom to use
it as he wishes and if he may invoke legal sanctions to protect that freedom,
irrespective of whether he is likely to make use of that freedom as another
person desires, so long as the other has no power to coerce him."
The question of whether there is a taking of private property for public
use by the United States within the meaning of the fifth amendment is to
be determined in light of the particular facts and circumstances involved."
511 LEW1s, op. cit. supra note 30, § 64.
'Corinack, Idcyat Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 224 (1931).
'IIamilton, op. cit. supra note :5, at : (.
'Crane v. Commissioner, 331 Ir.S. 1, (; (19().
,United States v. General Motors (or)oration, 323 U.S. 37:3, 377-78 (1944).
'United States v. 531/ Acres of Land, 139 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1943).
t mReiehelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932).0Ilelvering v. Elias. 122 F.2d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 1941).
OUnited States v. Pee Wee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1M1).
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The meaning of "property" as used in the amendment is a federal ques-
tion, but it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law. '
The application of these principles has given rise to much litigation,
and varying results have been reached. Numerous courts have refused to
find the existence of "property." The revocation of a permit authorizing
filling in of submerged land in navigable water was held not to constitute
a taking of property [without just compensation].l A landowner, having
been granted a right of eminent domain, had no interest under this un-
exercised power which gave rise to an estate of "private property. " Other
cases readily find "property" to exist. A placer mining claim on public
lands, perfected according to law, is property for which just compensation
must be paid if the claim is taken by the United States." A lessee for
years holding under a valid lease has such an interest in the property
taken as to be deemed an "owner" in the constitutional sense and to be
entitled to compensation for the taking of that interest."
FLOWAGE EASEMENTS
An easement is an interest in land in the possession of another which
entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the
land in which the interest exists. The owner of an easement is entitled
to protection from interference by third persons in such use or enjoyment.
An easement is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land, nor is
it a normal incident of any land possessed by the owner of the interest. An
easement is capable of creation by conveyance. ' The use to which an ease-
inent entitles its owner may consist of the privilege of positive action with-
in or upon the land subject to it, or it may consist in a right to compel
the owner of the land subject to it to refrain from action he could take
were his land free from the easement. If the use is of the first kind, the
easement is called an "affirmative easement"; if of the second, it is called
a "negative easement.' '0  A private easement is generally "property" in
the constitutional sense.' To entitle the holder to compensation for a
taking, however, the right must be an easement and not a mere privilege
enjoyed at the will of the owner of the servient tenement.'
A "flowage right," which is the right of one owner to flow water
upon the land of another by maintenance of a dam, is an "easement" which
is a liberty, a privilege, or an advantage in lands without profit and dis-
tinct from the ownership of the land itself.' The question presented in
the Virginia Electric" case waswhether such an interest in land riparian
OUnited States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945).
iMami Beach Jockey Club v. Dern, 86 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
"United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1942).
"United States v. North American Transportation and Trading Co., 53 Ct. Cl. 424(1918), aff'd, 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
6Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
O2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
"United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
"NicHOLs, § 5.72.
'Union Falls Power Co. v. Marinette County, 238 Wis. 134, 298 N.W. 598, 134 A.L.R.
958 (1941).
-365 U.S. 624 (1961).
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to a navigable stream is compensable within the terms of the fifth amend-
ment, i.e., whether this type of easement is "property" within that clause.
In the Twin City" decision, which became procedurally involved with
the decision in the Virginia Electric case, the problem was whether or not
the owner of the fee in such riparian lands was entitled to compensation
which included an amount for the value of the land as a site for a hydro-
electric power operation. The court stated that the interest of the United
States in the flow of a navigable stream originates in the commerce clause
of the Constitution." That clause speaks in terms of power, not property,
but the power is a dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion
of any competing or conflicting claims. The Court has called that power
a "dominant sevitude' ' or a "superior navigation easement.'"' In the
Twin City case the Court stated that if the owner of fast lands could de-
mand water-power value as part of his compensation, he could get the
value of a right that the Government, in the exercise of its dominent servi-
tude, can grant or withhold as it chooses. In other words, whether the right
was a valuable one or an empty one depended solely on the action of the
United States. What the Government can grant or withhold and exploit
for its own benefit has a value that is peculiar to it. The Court accordingly
ruled that water power value was not properly includable in the computa-
tion of what should be "just compensation.'"' It is clear that the exact
holding of the Twin City case is not controlling in a case involving the
question presented in the Virginia Electric case, but the rationale to be
applied would seem to be identical.
Examination of the "private property" for which the power company
claimed compensation should be made in light of the definitions and prin-
ciples enumerated in the earlier parts of this paper. It has acquired a
nonpossessory interest in land in which it did not own any other estate
or interest. Its only right was to flood the land with waters backed up
by a structure built across a navigable stream. Before any such structure
could be built, however, the federal government would have to issue a
license to the company allowing such construction." When the company
acquired its easement, it knew that it might never be able to exercise the
easement if the Government should refuse to issue a license. The company
did not have the right to "possess, use and dispose" of its interest in a
complete sense; nor did it have "untrammeled freedom" to use that in-
terest as it desired. The only possible use which could be made of the ease-
ment was dependent wholly on the permission and approval of the federal
government. When the Government chose to exercise its dominant right,
71350 U.S. 222 (1956).
72U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
"Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249
(1954).
"United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960).
"Subsequently, the circuit court ruled in United States v. 2,979.72 Acres of Land,
270 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1959), that the holding of the Twin City case did not apply
to other elements of value, such as value for agriculture or grazing purposes. The
court refused to recognize any difference in this respect regardless of whether the
question of compensation was a question involving the owner of the entire fee, in-
cluding all flowage rights, or just the owner of a flowage easement, distinct from
complete ownership of the land. This factual difference which is also present in
the Virginia Electric case is not noted by the Court.
"116 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1952).
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any right which the power company had was gone forever. Was the situa-
tion any different from that which would have resulted if the power com-
pany had requested a license (which it had not done here) and was refused
by the Government? Clearly not. Without doubt, in that circumstance
the company would be entitled to nothing from the Government.; the same
result should follow here.
It has been noted -that the majority opinion discussed the problem
merely as one of valuation. It found value in the easement on the ground
that the power company had the ability to destroy the agricultural and
forestry uses of the land. If the case had been considered as presenting
a problem of whether or not a property interest existed, the Court would
never have reached the question of valuation. Having reached it, however,
it would seem that any value related to the destruction of these uses would
inhere only in the owner of the complete fee. The ownership in the land
having been divided as it was, it is difficult to see how the destruction
value should in any way apply to the holder of a bare flowage easement
over the land of the owner of the rest of the fee. The Court, in effect,
required the United States "to pay something for nothing" in the Virginia
Electric case."
CONCLUSION
The definition of "private property" protected by the fifth amend-
ment has not been any less difficult than the definition of property for
other purposes. The problem has apparently been further complicated by
the desire of the judiciary to see that any "losses" caused by the public
acting in any way are not borne by individuals, but by the public itself."m
The cause of the private "property" owner should not be allowed to tri-
umph over that of the public where no real interest in property exists.
Qualified rights should be considered in light of the qualifying conditions
under which they exist. In an age of growing complexity in human rela-
tions at all levels, a careful reappraisal of the problems involved in this
area should be undertaken by the judiciary.
ROBERT CORONTZOS
-365 U.S. 624, 645 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
"
8Any such expansion would properly seem to require constitutional amendment.
1962] NOTES
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 23 [1961], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol23/iss2/4
